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IMPROVING EDUCATION:
HOW LARGE ARE THE BENEFITS?
HOW CAN IT BE DONE EFFICIENTLY?
"The fate of empires depends on the education of youth"
-Aristotle
If your plan is for one year, plant rice. For ten year plant frees.
For a hundred years, educate women and men.
-Kuan’-tze
The Problem
The National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) reports that 92 percent of
high school seniors cannot "integrate specialized scientific information" and do not have "the
capacity to apply mathematical operations in a variety of problem settings." (NAEP 1988a p. 51,
1988b p. 42) According to the 1992 National Adult Literacy Survey, only 23 percent of adults are
able to reliably determine correct change using information from a menu (National Center for
Education Statistics, 1994 Table 1.3).
Secondary school completers in Northern Europe and East Asia are considerably better
prepared in mathematics, science and foreign languages than their American counterparts.
Figures 1 to 4 plot the scores in Algebra, Biology, Chemistry and Physics during the early 1980s
against the proportion of the 18-year old population in the types of courses to which the
international test was administered (Postlethwaite and Wiley, 1994). The Americans who
participated in the Second International Mathematics Study were high school seniors in college
preparatory math courses. This group, which represented only 13 percent of American 17 year
olds, was thought roughly comparable to the 15 percent of youth in Finland and the 50 percent
of Hungarians who were taking college preparatory mathematics. In Algebra, the score of 40
percent correct for this very select group of American students was about equal to the score of
the much larger group of Hungarians and substantially below the Finnish score of 79 percent
correct (McKnight et al 1987).
The findings of the Second International Science Study were similar. Take Finland and
Canada, for example. The 41 percent of the Finnish students who were taking some biology in
their senior year of secondary school got 50 percent correct. The 28 percent of English
speaking Canadians taking biology got 43.7 percent correct. The 12 percent of Americans
taking a second biology course in senior year got 38 percent correct. The 16 percent of Finns
and the 25 percent of English speaking Canadians taking chemistry knew almost as much as
the 2 % of American high school seniors who were taking their second year of chemistry (many
of whom were in "Advanced Placement") (Postlethwaite and Wiley, 1994).
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It is sometimes said that low achievement is the price one must pay for greater access.
While the share of all adults with high school diplomas is higher in the U.S. than in other
nations, this is no longer the case for young adults. Table 1 presents data on the ratio of
secondary school diplomas awarded to population for a variety of industrialized countries. The
ratio is over 100 percent in Denmark, Finland and Germany, 90 percent in Japan, 85 percent in
France and 65 percent in England. Despite the minimal standards for getting a diploma in the
United States, the ratio of secondary school diplomas awarded to population 18 years of age
was only 73.7 percent in 1988, slightly below its level in 1968.1 Standards were lowered in the
1970s, but completion rates did not improve.
Participation in post secondary education is higher in the United States (see Table 1),
but most college freshmen are studying material that European university students studied in
secondary school. Many Europeans doubt that BAs from second rank American universities are
equivalent to the French Licence or the Dutch Doctoraal examen.
In the economically critical fields of science, mathematics, computer science and
engineering, degree production relative to population exceeds U.S. levels in Japan, Norway,
France and Ireland. Finland, Canada, Denmark, and Germany produce proportionately just
about as many people trained in these fields as the United States. Only Italy, the Netherlands
and Sweden are distinctly below the U.S. Many observers believe that the abundance and
quality of scientists and engineers has historically been an important source of competitive
advantage for American companies. This advantage is diminishing.
I. THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF EDUCATION
1.1 The Effect of the Quantity of Schooling on Wages
Educational attainment is the single most important determinant of a person's success in
the labor market. According to the most recent Census report, persons over the age of 18
without a high school degree earned only $12,809 on average in 1992, a poverty level standard
of living for a family of three. High school graduates earned 46 percent more than drop- uts
or $18,737 on average. Associate degrees holders earned 30 percent more than high
                                         
1 If GED certificates were counted as diplomas, American secondary school graduation rates would be about 10
percentage points higher. The labor market, however, does not view the GED as equivalent to a high school diploma. GED
certified high school equivalents are paid 6 percent more than high school dropouts but 8 to 11 percent less than high school
graduates. Most GED test takers spend little time preparing for the exam. The median examinee spent 20 hours preparing for
the exam and 21 percent did not prepare in any way. Their ASVAB test scores are above those of other high school dropouts
but significantly below those of high school graduates. (Cameron and Heckman1993). Hence, the OECD did not think GED
certificates should be counted as high school diplomas.
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school graduates or $24,398 on average. Bachelors degree holders earned 31 percent
more than those with AA degrees, or $32,629 on average. PhDs earned 68 percent more
than BAs and those with professional degrees earned 128 percent more than BAs
(Census Nov. 1994). Only a third or so of these wage differentials are caused by pre existing
differences in ability, motivation and family background.2 The lions share of the gains represent
the real value added of extra schooling. In the 50 years it has been tracked, the payoff to
schooling has never been higher.
Is there a danger of over doing the expansion of higher education? Newspaper stories
about laid off managers and professionals led some to mistakenly announce the end of the
strong labor market for college graduates. While the 1991-92 recession saw a cut back in the
hiring of recent college graduates, young high school graduates suffered even more. Even at
the height of the recession unemployment rates of college graduates never exceeded 3.5
percent. Their unemployment rates are now less than 2.5 percent.3 Those who completed their
BA in 1994 were quite successful in getting good jobs.
What about the future, however? Let us begin by looking at projections of the supply of
college graduates. The high economic payoffs to college during the late 1980s and 1990s
resulted in a big increase in the ratio of BAs awarded to the number of 22 year olds--from 21.6
percent in 1980 to 29.9 percent in 1992. This ratio is projected to increase further to 33.8
percent in the year 2000, a 56 percent increase over 1980 (NCES Jan. 1995). The
proportionate increase in the total number of BAs awarded, however, is much smaller because
the low birth rates of the 1960s and 70s means that there are significantly fewer individuals in
the 20 to 30 year old age cohort that typically receives most of the BAs. As a re ult, the ratio
of the number of BAs awarded to total employment fell from 1.09 percent in 1974 to 0.95
percent in 1980 and 0.96 percent in 1992. It is projected to fall even further to 0.88
percent in 2000 and 0.86 percent in 2005. Thus, despite the technology driven shift in
                                         
2 Corrected estimates of private returns to schooling can be obtained by including measures of ability in the model
(Griliches and Mason 1972; Taubman and Wales 1975, Hause 1975) or by using sibling data to match people on ability and
socioeconomic factors (Behrman et al. 1977; Olneck 1977). Corrected estimates of rates of return must also take into account
downward biases introduced by errors in measuring schooling (Bishop 1974; Griliches 1979) and the probability that those who
choose to continue schooling face higher rates of return than those who do not (Willis and Rosen 1979). When models
correcting for omitted variables and selection effects were estimated in the 1970s, impacts of years of schooling were typically
smaller than in simpler models but the effects were still quite strong. Ashenfelter and Krueger's (1992) recent studies employing
comparisons of identical twins which correct for the biasing effects of measurement error in schooling found the effect of
schooling to be about as large as the standard cross section relationship.
3 Unemployment rate of managers and professionals, which was 2.0 percent in the first quarter of 1989, rose to 3.5
percent in September 1992 and have since fallen to 2.2 percent by November 1994. The unemployment rate of operatives and
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employer demand in favor of college educated workers, the flow of new graduates into
the labor market has declined. To make matters worse the number of college graduates
retiring from the labor force is increasing every year (as the veterans who went to college
under the GI bill retire from the work force).  As a result, the ratio of workers with a college
degree to those with a high school degree or less is projected to grow at only 2.9 percent per
year between 1988 and 2000, significantly below the 3.5 percent per year growth of this ratio
between 1980 and 1988 and the 4.9 percent per year growth between 1972 and 1980 (Bishop
1992).
Now let us examine projections of the demand for college educated workers. In 1991
Shani Carter and I published two papers forecasting a continuation of upskilling trends (Bishop
and Carter 1991; Bishop 1992). These papers employed a regression analysis of changes in
occupational employment shares during the 1972 to 1991 period to project future occupational
employment shares. The variables found to have significant effects on occupational shares
were: a simple trend, the unemployment rate, the merchandise trade surplus as a proportion of
GDP, and the ratio of personal computers used in business to total employment. The personal
computer variable captures the accelerated introduction of computer technology during the
1980s as well as the direct effects of microcomputers. The preferred model containing all four
variables predicted that managerial, professional and technical jobs will account for 68 percent
of growth of occupational employment between 1990 and 2005. Dropping the variable
representing the share of the work force with a PC on their desk lowers the projected high skill
share to 57 percent and dropping both the trade deficit and PC share lowers it to 52.5 percent.
So far these projections are pretty much on track. M nagerial, professional and technical
jobs accounted for 59 percent of the 6,728,000 increase in jobs between November 1989
and November 1994.4
If, as predicted by our models, the relative demand for college educated workers
continues to grow at rates similar to those that prevailed in the 1960s, 70s and 80s, current very
                                                                                                                              
laborers, which was 7.7 percent in the first quarter of 1989, rose to 11.4 percent in July 1992 and has returned to 7.7 percent in
November 1994.
4 The BLS projects that managerial, professional and technical jobs will account for 40.9 percent of job growth to the
year 2005 (Silvestri and Lukasiewicz 1991). However, the BLS method of projecting occupational changes has consistently
under predicted the growth of managerial and professional jobs. They start with an assumption--the occupational composition of
employment in individual industries will not be radically different in the year 2005--that is manifestly wrong. A few ad hoc
adjustments are made to the occupational compositions projections for 2005, but most of these parameters are taken as fixed.
This results in a substantial understatement of upskilling trends. In 1981 the BLS projected that professional, technical and
managerial jobs would account for 28 percent of employment growth between 1978 and 1990. Data from the Current Population
Survey indicate that these occupations, in fact, accounted for 53.6 percent of 1978-90 job growth.
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high wage premiums for college education will continue and may even escalate further. The
latest data (presented in Figures 5a and 5b) support the predictions made 4 years ago of
continuing escalation of the wage differential between college graduates and high school
graduates. The earnings of male college graduates fell slightly from 1989 to 1993. But the
wages of high school graduates fell even more, so the payoff to getting a college degree grew
dramatically. For females, there were increases in both the earnings of college graduates and
the differential between high school and college graduate. The present discounted value (PDV)
at age 21 of the earnings plus fringe benefit gains associated with a college degree are
$360,000 of which at least $240,000 represents real value added.5 A four year college
education entails approximately $37,500 in student time costs and $54,500 in instructional costs
(OECD 1993 Table P6). Consequently, the social benefits of a college education are at least 2.5
times the social costs.
Clearly increases in the quantity of schooling have high social payoffs. Most of the policy
debate, however, is about the quality dimension. How would improvements in student
achievement affect the economy?  It is to this I now turn.
1.2 The Effect of Education Quality on Wages and Productivity
The mathematical, scientific and technical competencies of workers have big effects on:
* their wages and earnings,
* their productivity on-the-job and
* the nation's standard of living and competitiveness.
Each of these will be taken up in turn.
1.2.1--Consequences for Wages and Earnings
Academic achievement has major effects on the wages of adults even when
demographic characteristics and years of schooling are held constant. In the Department of
Education's literacy survey, high school graduates who are in the top 5 percent in quantitative
literacy earn more than twice as much as high school graduates who are in the bottom 15
percent of the literacy distribution. Holding years of schooling constant, a grade level equivalent
increase in quantitative literacy raised 1992 annual earnings by 5.7 percent or about $900
                                         
5 All of the present values calculated in this paper assume that unreported earnings, fringe benefits and employer paid
taxes on labor sum to 25 percent of reported earnings, working lifetimes are 45 years on average and a 5 percent real rate of
discount (Bishop 1974). Thus the formula for PDV = [earnings differential] *1.25*20*.895. The calculations also assume no
growth in the magnitude of the differential being valued. In reality both inflation and productivity growth will cause all wage
differentials to grow over time at roughly the rate at which nominal wages grow. This means that our calculations are
conservative and comparable to PDV estimates which assumed nominal wage growth of 3 percent per year and which use an
interest rate of 8 percent, the current coupon on long term government bonds.
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annually (NCES 1995 Table 4.7). The present discounted value (PDV) of the increase in
compensation resulting from a one grade level equivalent (GLE) increase in quantitative literacy
is about $20,100 (see Table 2).
Analysis of a higher wage group, household heads in the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics, found that increases in general academic achievement raised earnings by about 4
percent or $1400 annually per GLE (Bishop 1989). The PDV of the increase in compensation
resulting from the one GLE achievement gain was about $31,300 in 1993 dollars.
A third study has examined the effect of different types of academic and technical
competencies on hourly wage rates and annual earnings of young people in 1981, 1982, 1983,
1986, 1989 and 1991 (Bishop 1994). The effects of a one population standard deviation
[approximately 5 Grade Level Equivalents (GLE)] increase in various kinds of achievement are
presented in Figures 6a, 6b, 6c, and 6d. At the time of the 1991 interview this sample of NLS
Youth ranged from 26 to 33 years of age.
For young women, speed in arithmetic computation and mathematical reasoning ability
both had substantial effects on wage rates and earnings. A one GLE increase in both raised
wage rates by 2.3 and 2.8 percent in 1986 and 1990 respectively and earnings by 4.8 and 5.2
percent respectively. Verbal competence had somewhat more modest positive effects on wages
(+.5 percent per GLE) and earnings (+ 1.5 percent per GLE). Knowledge of technology and
science had no significant effect on wage rates or earnings. A one GLE increase in all
competencies raised annual earnings by $715 in 1990.
For young men, technical competence, math reasoning ability and speed in arithmetic
computation raised wage rates and earnings, but verbal and scientific competence did not. A
one GLE increase in all competencies increased earnings by $956 in 1990. Table 2 summarizes
a variety of estimates of PDV in 1992- 3 dollars of the compensation increase that the models
predict will result from a one GLE increase in all types of competence holding years of schooling
constant. Row 4 presents PDV estimates for 1990 data when the sample was 25 to 32 years
old. The PDV of a one GLE improvement in test scores is $18,200 for women and $23,500 for
men. These estimates are lower bound estimates of the total effects of a one GLE increase in
academic achievement. Nevertheless, they are many times larger than the instructional costs
for one year of elementary and secondary schooling--$5,566.
Rewards for academic achievement are small at first but grow with age. Academic
achievement improves access to jobs offering training and enables workers to get more out of
the training. Furthermore, academic achievement is poorly signaled to employers so there are
long delays before the labor market identifies and rewards workers who because of their
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academic achievements are exceptionally productive workers.  Measures of non-cognitive
achievement in high school such as rates of attendance, extracurricular activities and an
absence of discipline problems also fail to have positive effects on initial success in the labor
market for the non-college bound in High School and Beyond data (Hotchkiss 1985, Bishop,
Blakemore and Low 1985, Rosenbaum 1989).
An important implication of this analysis is that mathematical and technical skills of
average workers generate much greater wage and productivity benefits than verbal and
scientific skills. Analysis of 1984-85 annual earnings using NLSY data found that a one
PopSD increase in both computational speed and mathematical reasoning ability raised annual
earnings of young women (men) by $1174 ($1097), some of it coming from a higher probability
of being employed. The effect of a one PopSD increase in verbal (science) achievement on
annual earnings was only $147 (-$91) for young women and -$150 (-$124) for young men. A
one PopSD increase in technological knowledge increased earnings of young men by $1343
(Bishop 1993).
1.2.2--Consequences for Productivity on the Job
Direct estimates of the relative importance of different competencies can be obtained by
estimating models in which measures of job performance in military and civilian jobs are
regressed on scores on a variety of tests assessing academic and technical competencies.
Figures 7 and 8 present the results of two studies of the training success and job performance
of Marine recruits (Sims and Hyatt 1981, Maier and Grafton 1981). The darker bars provide
estimates of the effect of a one population standard deviation improvement in each of the
ASVAB subtest composites on the hands-on job performance, while holding all other test scores
constant. The lighter bars provide similar estimates from models predicting paper and pencil
measures of job knowledge at the completion of training. In non-clerical jobs in the military a
one PopSD increase in a technical skills raised productivity 11.9 percent and a similar increase
in mathematics reasoning skills raised productivity by 5.3 percent. The other skills had much
smaller effects on productivity. In clerical jobs in the military, a one PopSD increase in math
reasoning ability raised productivity by 10.8 percent and a similar increase in verbal skills raised
productivity by 3.5 percent (Bishop 1994).
Studies of job performance in civilian jobs get similar results. Competence in
mathematics has major effects on supervisory ratings of performance in all jobs. Technical
competence has big effects in blue collar and technical jobs. Verbal ability has no effect on
performance in blue collar jobs, but in clerical, technical and service jobs, it makes important
contributions to productivity (Bishop 1994).
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Not only does competence in mathematics help you get high paying jobs, it makes you
more productive in specific jobs, even in clerical jobs such as typist which casual observation
suggests require verbal skins not mathematics skills. Why? I think the reason math (including
algebra) has such a pervasive effect on worker productivity is the logic and problem solving
skills that people learn in mathematics courses. These skills help clerical workers learn word
processing and other computer programs and helps them solve other everyday problems at
work.
The PDVs for general improvements in academic and technical achievement range from
$14,200 for women in clerical jobs to $31,900 for males in non-clerical jobs in the military.
Because they hold the job fixed, these estimates measure only a portion of the total direct
productivity benefits of improvements in academic and technical achievement. Nevertheless,
these downward biased estimates are many times larger than the costs of one year of
instruction. Consequently, even rather expensive reforms of schooling that increase
learning--such as longer school days and longer school years--probably have benefit cost ratios
that substantially exceed 1.
1.2.3 Consequences for Economic Growth
Improvements in educational achievement were important contributors to productivity
growth during the first three-quarters of the twentieth century (Jorgenson, G llop and Fraumeni
1987, Denison 1988). Did the contribution of education to productivity growth diminish after
1973? Were problems in the education sector contributors to the productivity growth slowdown
and the resulting declines in competitiveness and real wages? The answer is yes.
The 1.25 grade level equivalent decline in the test scores of American secondary school
graduates between 1967 and 1980 signaled a significant deterioration in the quality of young
entrants into the American work force. This decline was unprecedented, for prior to 1967
student test scores had been rising steadily for more than 50 years. In a paper published in The
American Economic Review in 1989, 1 calculated that improvements in general academic
achievement (GAA) holding years of schooling constant contributed an additional .212 percent
per year to the growth of the quality of labor from 1948 to 1973. Gains in GAA holding schooling
constant, thus, increased labor quality by 5.4 percent over the course of the full 25 year period.
Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987) estimate that increases in years of schooling caused
labor quality to grow .725 percent per year or a total of 19.9 percent over the course of the 25
years. In combination, the gains in years of schooling and in GAA holding schooling constant
increased labor quality 26.3 percent by the end of the period.
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After 1973, however, gains in years of schooling and the GAA of those completing
specified amounts of schooling began to decelerate. Between 1973 and 1979, the contribution
of years of schooling to the growth of labor quality diminished to .612 percent per year. The
contribution of schooling-constant GAA gains to the growth of labor quality fell to .157 percent
per year between 1973 and 1980 and fell even further to .084 percent per year between 1980
and 1987. If the test scores of high school graduates had continued to grow at the rate that
prevailed between 1942 and 1967, labor quality would have been 3.6 percent higher in 1990.
The annual social cost in terms of foregone GNP was more than $120 billion in 1990. Even with
a forecast of rapid improvements in the quality of elementary and secondary education in the
1990s, the labor quality shortfall grows to 5.5 percent in 2000 and 6.7 percent in 2010.6
While the education enterprise has historically been an important source of economic
growth, education reform is not a silver bullet that can cure our overall productivity growth
problem. A reform of elementary and secondary education that increased the competence of all
school leavers by one grade level equivalent (without increasing years spent in school) would
be considered a big success. Yet, since the annual flow of young school completers into the
labor market is only 3 percent of total employment, such a reform would increase productivity
growth by only 0.20 percent per year?7 It would take 5 years for this reform to increase
productivity by just 1 percent. Thus, successful reform of K-12 education is not likely to
dramatically improve productivity in the short and medium term. Similarly, the education
problems that developed in the late 1960s and 1970s were not the primary cause of the
subsequent slowdown of productivity growth. Variations in productivity growth rates over time
have many causes, of which education is only one.
This does not imply, however, that the productivity consequences of educational
achievement are of little import. Rather it implies that they take a long time to develop. Our
hypothetical reform raises productivity growth for roughly 40 years and the 6.7 percent increase
                                         
6 The only way to prevent these forecasts from being realized is to change the relationship between GAA at age 17 and
GAA as an adult. This might be accomplished by attracting massive numbers of adults back into school, by expanding
educational offerings on television and/or by inducing employers to provide general education to long term employees.
7 I make the conservative assumption that controlling for preexisting ability differences reduces the impact of a year of
secondary school on earnings from the 16 to 20 percent found in raw census data to 10 percent. This 10 percent figure is
multiplied by 2/3rds, labor compensations' share of total output, to get the long run effect of the reform on GDP. The annual
figure is obtained by multiplying .067 by .03, the ratio of the flow of school leavers to the total labor force. Slow productivity
growth is also often blamed on insufficient saving and investment, yet a $120,000,000,000 (2 percent of GDP) increase in the
savings rate would increase the growth of Net National Product by only about 0.1 percent per year (Denison 1986). In other
words, aggregate productivity levels are not very sensitive to any kinds of policy intervention whether it be investment in physical
or human capital.
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in annual output that eventually results is permanent. The nation spends only 4.5 percent of
GDP on elementary and secondary education. If a reform of that sector can yield a benefit that
on an annual basis is 50 percent greater than total annualspending on K-12 education, the
case for that reform would appear to be very strong, even if it takes decades for the reform to
have its full effect. If such a reform were implemented now, the present discounted value (using
a 5 percent real discount rate) of the projected increase in GDP would be roughly 3.4 trillion
dollars.8 Education has effects which last a lifetime, indeed generally for many lifetimes
(Haveman and Wolfe 1984).
II. EFFICIENT WAYS OF IMPROVING ACHIEVEMENT
One of the unique characteristics of the American education system is that all the really
important decisions--budget allocations, hiring selections, salary levels, teaching strategies,
grading standards, course offerings, pupil assignments to courses and programs, disciplinary
policies, etc.--are made by classroom teachers and school administrators who are responding to
local political pressures. Federal and state officials are far removed from the classroom, and the
instruments available to them for inducing improvements in quality and standards are limited.
They do not have effective control of the standards and expectations that prevail in the
classroom. They do not control the allocation of school funds between academics and athletics.
Aid from higher levels of government can be increased; but econometric studies suggest
that increases in state aid reduce local property tax collections by a significant amount (Carroll
1982; Ehrenberg and Chaykowski 1988). For every extra dollar of noncategorical state aid to
local school districts only about 50 cents is spent on education by the locality: the rest either
lowers tax rates or enables the community to spend more on other public functions. For
categorical programs like Title 1, the increase in local education spending is larger, but some
leakage appears to be inevitable (Tsang and Levin 1983; Monk 1990). The role of the federal
government is inevitably very limited. Most of the key decisions are made by students and
parents.
2.1 What Must Be Done
Educational researchers and policy makers have proposed a host of changes in
educational practice and parent behavior designed to increase academic achievement. A
sampling follows:
                                         
8 We assume that it takes 40 years to replace the entire work force at a rate of .025 per year. The formula for calculating
the present discounted value of an educational reform which raises the productivity of all school leavers by 10 percent is
.10(2/3)($6.0 trillion)(.025)(1/r)(1/r)(1-e~') = $3.4 trillion.
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• Teachers must assign more homework and the assignments must be completed. Yet in
some schools "Students were given class time to read Th  Scarlet Letter, The Red Badge of
Courage, Huckleberry Finn, and The Great Gatsby because many would not read the books
if they were assigned as homework. Parents had complained that such homework was
excessive (Powell, Farrar and Cohen 1985, p.81)."
• Parents must tell children: "Turn off the TV and do your homework." Currently, American
students spend 19.6 hrs/wk watching TV while students spend only 6.3 hrs/wk in Austria,
9.0 hrs/wk in Finland, 5.9 hrs/wk in Norway and 10.9 hrs/wk in Canada (OECD 1986).
• Students must be engaged in learning--Yet, Frederick, Walberg and Rasher (1979)
estimated 46.5 percent of potential learning time was lost due to absence, lateness, and
inattention. After hundreds of hours of classroom observation, Theodore Sizer (1984)
described students as, 'As all too often docile, compliant and without initiative (p. 54). "
• Students must choose rigorous math and science courses. Yet of those graduating in 1982,
only 31 percent had taken chemistry, only 14 percent had taken physics. Only 46 percent
had taken geometry and only 35 percent had taken Algebra 11 (NCES 1993 pp. 68, 72). In
Canada 25 percent of all 18 year olds are studying science at a level of difficulty that is
comparable to AP level courses taken by only about 3 percent of U.S. students
(Posthlewaite and Wiley 1992).
• School Boards must be willing to raise local taxes so they can offer better salaries to attract
better teachers to their community. Relative to other workers, experienced American upper
secondary teachers are currently paid less than 80 percent of what their counterparts in
Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and the United
Kingdom earn(Nelson and O'Brien 1993, pp. 73-74, 9091).
• Parents must demand higher standards at their local school. Yet despite the fact that their
5th graders were far behind their Taiwanese and Japanese counterparts in mathematics,
91% of American mothers rated their local school "good" or "excellent." Only 42 percent of
Taiwanese and 39 percent of Japanese parents were equally positive (Stevenson, Lee and
Stigler 1986).
What almost all of these proposed explanations of educational deficits have in common is that
key actors in the learning enterprise (students, parents, teachers, administrators and/or school
boards) are being accused of giving insufficient priority to the goal of academic achievement.
Some other goal--eg. leisure, avoiding controversy, low taxes, equity--is taking precedence over
the academic achievement of students.
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Regardless of which of the proposed causes of poor academic performance are the
most important, a more fundamental question remains: "Why do American students, parents,
teachers, administrators and school boards apparently place a lower priority on the goal of
academic achievement than their counterparts in Europe and East Asia." My answer to this
question is:
The fundamental cause of the low effort level of American students,
parents, and voters in school elections is the absence of good signals of
effort and learning in high school and a consequent lack of rewards for
effort and learning ... In most other advanced countries mastery of the
curriculum taught in high school is assessed by ... examinations which are
set ... at the national or regional level. Grades on these exams signal the
student's achievement to colleges and employers and influence the jobs
that graduates get and the universities and programs to which they are
admitted. How well the graduating seniors do on these exams influences
the reputation of the school and in some countries the number of students
applying for admission to the school. In the United States, by contrast,
students take aptitude tests that are not intended to assess the learning
that has occurred in most of the classes taken in high school. 77je primary
signals of academic achievement are grades and rank in class--criteria
which assess achievement relative to other students in the school or
classroom, not relative to an external standard (Bishop 1990b).
2.2--Curriculum Based External Examinations
STUDENT AND PARENT INCENTIVES: External assessments of achievement in
specific high school subjects increase rewards for learning and this should induce the student to
choose tougher courses and work harder in them. When such exams are absent, many
students choose courses that have the reputation of being fun and not requiring much work to
get a good grade. As one student who had avoided the harder courses even though she was
sure she could do the work explained her decision: "Why should I do it, [the extra work] if I don't
have to?" (Ward 1994) Teachers know this and adjust their style of teaching and their
homework assignments with an eye to maintaining enrollment levels:
An angry math teacher [who remembering] the elimination of a carefully planned
program in technical mathematics for vocational students simply because not
enough signed up for it,...[said] 'Its easy to see who really makes decisions about
what schools teach: the kids do.' (Powell, Farrar and Cohen 1985, p. 9)
External assessments also have pervasive effects on the structure of student rewards.
When signals of achievement assess performance relative to fellow students (eg. grades and
class rank) rather than relative to an absolute standard, students have a personal interest in
persuading each other not to study. The studious are called nerds, in part, because they are
making it more difficult for others to get good grades. Since devoting time to studying for an
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exam is costly, the welfare of the entire class is maximized if no one studies for exams which
are graded on a strict curve. The cooperative solution is "no one studies more than the
minimum." Participants are generally able to tell who has broken the "minimize studying" code
and reward those who conform and punish those who do not. Side payments and punishments
are made in a currency of friendship, respect and ridicule that is not limited in supply. For most
students the benefits that might result from studying for the exam are less important than the
very certain costs of being considered a "brain geek", "grade grubber" or "acting White," so most
students abide by the "minimize studying" "don't raise your hand too much" norm. Most
American students are part of friendship circles in which the following norms prevail: It is OK to
be smart. You cannot help that. But, it is definitely not OK to spend a lot of time studying.
Instead, use your free time to socialize, participate in athletics or earn money. When l arning is
assessed relative to an outside standard, students no longer have a personal interest in getting
the teacher off track or persuading each other to refrain from studying.
ADMINISTRATOR INCENTIVES: Some American school administrators focus on
lowering the failure rate rather than raising achievement and end up pressuring their teachers to
lower standards. A principal who had recently fired a teacher for failing too many of her students
justified his decision with the following:
I have made it very clear that one of my goals is to decrease the failure rate, to
make sure the kids feel good about learning, stay in class, stay in school and do
well... Math is just a big body of knowledge, what is Algebra H across the nation
anyway?" he asks. When he taught band, he adds, he certainly didn't expect kids
to finish the year as musicians--but he did want them to know more about music
than they did before ... All the talk about preparing students for college struck him
as "ludicrous." Instead the goal should be to keep students studying math
(Bradley, Sept 19, 1993 p. 19, 20).
When there is no external assessment of academic achievement, students and their
parents benefit little from administrative decisions that opt for higher standards, more qualified
teachers or a heavier student work load. The immediate consequences of such
decisions--higher taxes, more homework, having to repeat courses, lower GPA's, complaining
parents, a greater risk of being denied a diploma--are ll negative. Since college admission
decisions have historically been based on rank in class, GPA and aptitude tests, not externally
assessed achievement in high school courses, upgraded standards will not improve the college
admission prospects of next year's graduates. Graduates will probably do better in difficult
college courses and will be more likely to get a degree, but that benefit is uncertain and far in
the future. Maybe over time the school's reputation and, with it, the admission prospects of
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graduates will improve because the current graduates are more successful in local colleges.
That, however, is even more uncertain and postponed.
The Scholastic Aptitude Test is no substitute for curriculum based exams because it
does not assess knowledge and understanding of science, history, social science, statistics and
calculus or the ability to write (Jencks and Crouse 1982). Consequently, parents can see that
improving the teaching of these subjects win have only minor effects on how their children do on
the SAT, so why worry about standards? In any case, doing well on the SAT matters only for
those who aspire to attend a selective college. Most American students plan to attend public
colleges which admit all high school graduates from the state with the requisite courses.
External exams in high school subjects can be expected to transform the signaling
environment. There is now a very visible payoff to hiring better teachers and improving the
school's science laboratories. Larger numbers of students pass the external exams and this in
turn influences college admissions decisions. School reputations will now tend to reflect student
academic performance rather than the family background of the community or the success of
football and basketball teams. If additionally parents and students can choose which high school
to attend and aid from higher levels of government is based on enrollment, the stakes for the
school administrators become very high indeed. Poor student performance on the external
exams might force layoffs of school staff.
2.2--Evidence of the Effects of Curriculum Based Exams on Learning
Probably the best evidence on the impact of curriculum based exams comes from
comparing jurisdictions with such examinations to those without. The jurisdictions should be
reasonably large, because otherwise colleges and employers are not likely to use grades on the
curriculum-based exams in their selection decisions, so the rewards for doing well may be quite
limited.
New York vs the Rest of the United States: New York State is reasonably large and
has a Regents Examination system which reaches over half of the state's high school
students?9 It is, indeed, the only state in the U.S. with a curriculum based examination system
                                         
9 About 56 percent of 9th graders take the Mathematics Course I exam and, of these, 24 percent fail. Similar proportions
of 10th and 11th graders take the global studies, biology and English exams. Failure rates were 20 percent in global studies, 18
percent in biology and 13 percent in English. The great bulk of those not taking Regents exams are in courses that are
considerably less challenging than Regents level courses. The fact that nearly half of New York students are avoiding Regents
courses because they perceive them to be too much work or too difficult suggests that the standard of the exam is about as high
as is feasible considering current average achievement levels in the state.
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covering the majority of high school graduates.10  California is currently trying to introduce one.
Consistent with the theory laid out above, the Regents exams (or something else unique to New
York State) has raised statewide achievement levels. When the family income, parental
education, race and gender of SAT test takers are controlled, New York State has the highest
adjusted mean Scholastic Aptitude Test score of the sample of 38 states with adequate
numbers of test takers to be included in the study (Graham and Husted, 1993).11 This occurs
despite that fact that Regents exam grades account for less than half of the course grade and
influence only the type of diploma received. A passing score on Regents exams i not
necessary for admission to non-u iversity higher education and employers ignore exams results
when they make hiring decisions.
Comparing Canadian Provinces:  Probably the best place to test hypotheses about
the impact of curriculum-based external examinations is Canada. Some Canadian
provinces--Quebec, Newfoundland, Alberta, New Brunswick and British Columbia--have
curriculum-based exams; the others do not (U.S. GAO 1993). The hypotheses outlined in
section 2.1 were tested in data on the mathematics and science competence of 42,241
Canadian and American 13 year olds from the International Assessment of Educational
Progress (LAEP). Holding the social class background of students constant, students from
Canadian provinces with examination systems were substantially (23 percent of a standard
deviation) better prepared in mathematics and 18 percent of a standard deviation better
prepared in science than students from provinces lacking such exams. The effect of an exam
system on mathematics achievement of 13 year olds was larger in a standard deviation metric
than the decline in math SAT scores between 1969 and 1980 that has been such a focus of
public concern.
                                         
10 The Advanced Placement (AP) examinations are an exception to the generalization that the U.S. lacks a national
system of curriculum-based examinations. Students who take these courses and pass the examinations may receive college
credit for high school work. While it is growing rapidly, AP is still a very small program. In 1988 only 8,022 of the 22,902 U.S. high
schools offered any AP courses. Only 52 AP exams were taken on average in each participating high school (The College Board
1988). Of the 11th and 12th graders in 1993, only 2.8 percent took an AP English exam, 2.3 percent took an AP history exam,
1.7 percent took the AP calculus exam, and 1.7 percent took an AP science exam (NCES 1993). AP students learn more not just
because they are a self selected group of highly able students but because the external examination aligns incentives in a way
that induces both teachers and students to give higher priority to learning.
11 Dynarski and Gleason (1993) have also predicted state mean SAT scores while controlling school resource
variables and characteristics of the state's population obtained from the Census. Graham and Husted's analysis is preferable for
our purposes because it uses data on the background of the students who took the test and no effort was made to control school
resource variables that might be influenced by the existence of Regents exams.
Improving Education WP 95-21
Page 18
The analysis also found that examination systems had pervasive effects on school
administrators, teachers and parents. In the provinces with external exams, schools were more
likely to:
--employ specialist teachers of mathematics and science
--employ teachers who had studied the subject in college,
--have high quality science laboratories
--Schedule extra hours of math and science instruction
--assign more homework in math, in science and in other subjects
--have students do or watch experiments in science class and
--Schedule frequent tests in math and science class.
At home students watch less TV, spend more time reading for fun, and are more likely to report
their parents want them to do well in math and science. In addition, parents are more likely to
talk to their child about what they are learning at school. None of the undesirable effects that
opponents of external exams have predicted came about.
Other natural experiments yield similar findings. Sweden eliminated its system of
high/medium stakes examinations in the early 1970s. It is clear in Figures 9 and 10 that in the
decade that followed, the performance of Swedish secondary school seniors on international
assessments of achievement in mathematics and science deteriorated relative to other nations
(Bishop 1984b).
III. A STRATEGY FOR IMPROVING SECONDARY EDUCATION
It is easy to list ways of increasing educational achievement: greater attention in class,
more reading, less TV, more homework, more challenging courses, better school climates,
better teaching, more competent teachers and longer school years. There are, however, no
magic bullets. Young people in other nations learn more than our youth because they work
harder at it. What is difficult is identifying practical ways of inducing 47,000,000 students to
study harder and 80,000,000 parents to demand higher quality, higher standards education for
their children. There are 22,731 public secondary schools in the United Sates that are run by
15,358 largely autonomous local education agencies.
This section of the paper outlines a strategy of change built around increasing the
rewards at both the individual and community levels for improvements in academic
achievement. The key to motivating students to learn and parents to demand a quality
education is recognizing and rewarding learning effort and achievement. Some students are
attracted to serious study of a subject by an intrinsic fascination with the subject. They must
pay, however, a heavy price in the scorn of their peers and lost free time. Society offers them
little reward for their effort. Most students are not motivated to study by a love of the subject.
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Sixty-two percent of 10th graders agree with the statement, "I don't like to do any more school
work than I have to" (Longitudinal Survey of American Youth or LSAY, Q. AA37N). As a result,
far too few high school students put serious time and energy into learning and society suffers.
If this situation is to be turned around, the peer pressure against studying needs to be
reduced and rewards for learning need to be increased. The full diversity of types and levels of
accomplishment need to be signaled so that everyone--no matter how advanced or far
behind--faces a reward for greater time and energy devoted to learning. Learning
accomplishments need to be described on an absolute scale so that improvements in the quality
and rigor of the teaching and greater effort by all students in a school make everybody better
off. Colleges need to be induced to select students on the basis of externally validated
achievements, not by "aptitude" test scores or rank in class.
If employers know about the academic achievements of job applicants, they can be
counted on to provide the rewards needed to motivate study. Ninety-two p rcent of 10th graders
say they "often think about what type of job I will be doing after I finish school" (LSAY, Q.
AA13C). If the labor market rewards learning in school, high school students will respond by
studying harder and local voters will, be more willing to pay the taxes necessary to have better
local schools. The Commission on Workforce Quality and Labor Market Efficiency advocated
such a change in 1989:
The business community should ... show through their hiring and promotion decisions
that academic achievements will be rewarded (1989, p. 9).
High-school students who excel in science and mathematics should be rewarded with
business internships or grants for further study (1989, p. 11).
Some might react to this strategy for achieving excellence by stating a preference for
intrinsic over extrinsic motivation of learning. This, however, is a false dichotomy. Nowhere else
are people expected to devote thousands of hours to a difficult task while receiving only intrinsic
rewards. Public recognition of achievement and the symbolic and material rewards received by
achievers are important generators of intrinsic motivation. They are, in fact, one of the central
ways a culture symbolically transmits and promotes its values.12
                                         
12 Another possible argument against policies designed to induce employers to reward high school students who study
is that poor students will not be considered if an employer learns of this fact. What those who make this argument do not realize
is that the policy of providing no information to employers about performance in high school results in no recent graduates
(whether good or poor student) getting a job that pays well and offers opportunities for training and promotions. In effect it is
being proposed that the interests of the students who do not study and are discipline problems should take precedence over the
interests of the students who lived by the schools rules and studied hard. There is nothing unfair about letting high school GPA's
influence the allocation of young people to the best jobs. The GPA's are an average which reflects performance on 100's of tests,
and the evaluations of over 20 teachers each of which is based on over 180 days of interaction. Selection decisions must be
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HOW CAN WE BE SURE THIS STRATEGY WILL WORK? WE KNOW IT WORKS BECAUSE
IT HAS ALREADY WORKED.
WE HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING THIS STRATEGY FOR MORE THAN A DECADE. Market
responses to technological change have raised the extrinsic rewards for studying in high school.
During the 1970s employers typically ignored academic achievement when hiring front line
workers. They now pay more attention to the academic qualifications and, as a result, the labor
market reward for mathematical ability has risen dramatically (Murnane, Willett and Levy 1994).
The payoffs to getting associates degrees and bachelors
degrees have nearly doubled.
The education sector has also acted to strengthen rewards for study. Selective colleges
have increasingly based admissions decisions on the rigor of the courses that students took in
high school. They have reduced their reliance on the SAT and increasingly are discounting high
grades obtained in easy courses. States have established minimum competency tests for
graduation and increased the number of mathematics and science courses students need to
graduate.
The increase in rewards for achievement has caused a rise in standards and in student
study effort. Homework assigned and completed has increased. The percentage of 13 year olds
reporting they either had no homework or did not do it fell from 33 percent in 1982 to 9 percent
in 1990. The percentage of 17 year olds reporting they did at least one hour of homework each
day rose from 32.5 percent in 1978 to 66 percent in 1990 (NCES 1993 p. 122, 351). High school
graduation rates are creeping up. Students are taking more rigorous courses. Between 1982
and 1990 enrollment shares rose 20 percentage points for Geometry, 14 points for Algebra 11,
19 points for Chemistry and 8 points for Physics (NCES 1993 p. 68). The number of students
taking AP exams has tripled.
Higher standards and greater student effort have in turn resulted in higher achievement.
NAEP MATHEMATICS AND SCIENCE SCORES AT AGE 17 HAVE RISEN MORE THAN A
GRADE LEVEL EQUIVALENT. Table 3 and Figure 11 present the evidence. Between 1982
                                                                                                                              
made somehow. If measures of performance in school are not available, the hiring selection will be determined by the chemistry
of a job interview and idiosyncratic recommendations of a single previous employer. Since many employers will not request the
information, providing information on student performance does not prevent the poorer student from getting a job; it only
influences the quality of the job that the student is able to get.
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and 1992, mathematics scores of 17 year olds rose 1.06 GLEs (9 points) and science scores
rose 1.22 GLEs (11 points). Reading scores have risen .53 GLEs since 1980.13
The declines in achievement during the 1970s have been just about erased. This has
been accomplished in the face of growing numbers of students from minority and disadvantaged
backgrounds. Between 1977 and 1990, the black and Hispanic share of NAEP test takers rose
from 16 to 23 percent. Their achievement levels improved by roughly 2 grade level equivalents
between 1980-82 and 1992. While the absolute levels of achievement remain disappointing,
substantial progress has been made and rising NAEP scores for younger students suggests
that the achievement of high school graduates will probably continue to improve.
The 1+ grade level equivalent gain in mathematics and science achievement is nothing
to sneer at. Because of it, each high school graduates during the 1990s can expect to earn an
additional $1000+ per year for the rest of their life. That is the implication of the numbers
presented in Table 2. If the gains in math and science were replicated in all other subjects and
in the non-cognitive competencies such as dependability and cooperation that normally attend
one additional year of schooling, new-entrants into the labor force would now be 10 percent
more productive than those who entered at the beginning of the 1980s (the example discussed
at the end of section 1.2.3). The increase in GDP that would result has a present
discounted value of 3.4 trillion dollars.
My conclusion is that education reform is generally headed in the right direction. We
appear to be moving ever so cautiously down a path that leads to curriculum based
examination systems in many states and school districts. There is no need for a single
national system of curriculum based exams. Since curriculum objectives will differ from state
to state, states will need to choose the examination/assessment system that fits their goals.
States can either develop their own or adopt examinations developed by national
organizations such as the College Board, ACT or the National Council of Teachers of
Mathematics. The first step is coming to some agreement about what we want students to
learn in each subject and how to assess it. This will be difficult, but, if the choices are made
at the state rather than the national level, I think agreements can be forged in most states for
most subjects.
If it is to survive in the U.S. political environment, the assessments must hand out
good news most of the time. Their voluntary character will tend to assure that because
                                         
13 Grade level equivalents on the NAEP IRT scale sores can be calculated by dividing the difference between the scores
of 17 year old students and 13 year old students by four. Using this simple approach we can see that a GLE is 8.5 points on the
NAEP mathematics scale, 9 points on the NAEP science scale and 7.5 points on the NAEP reading scale (Muffis, et al. 1994).
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students and districts that anticipate failing will not volunteer to be assessed. As with the AP
exams and European exams, multiple levels of achievement will have to be signaled. There
must be honor in simply undertaking the challenge and substantial rewards for those who do
well. The system will have to start small and grow the way the Bac did in France and the AP
exams have in the United States. Consequently, it will probably be decades before subject
based examination systems are widespread in the United States.
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Table 1: Graduation Rates for Secondary and Postsecondary Education
Sec.Dipl
/Pop18
Bachelors
/Pop22
Sci,Eng,Mat
h
Deg/Pop25
34
Sec.Dipl
/Pop18
Bachelor
/Pop22
Sci,Eng,Mat
h
Deg/Pop25
34
Australia --- 24.4% 8.2% Italy 76% 9.2% 2.6%
Canada 73% 33.3% 6.2% Japan 91% 23.7% 9.7%
Denmark 100% 16.5% 6.7% Netherland
s
82% 8.3% 2.5%
Finland 125% 17.2% 7.0% Norway 89% 30.8% 7.9%
France 76% 16.3% 7.2% Sweden 80% 12.0% 4.0%
Germany 117% 13.3% 6.8% United
Kingdom
74% 18.4% 7.7%
Ireland 51% 16.0% 8.8% United
States
74% 29.6% 6.5%
Source: OECD, Education at a Glance, 1993, p. 176, 179 & 185. Column 1 is the ratio of
secondary school diplomas and credentials awarded in 1991 to population 18 years of age. It
exceeds 100 percent in Denmark, Finland and Germany because older individuals from larger birth
cohorts are completing their secondary schooling and because some individuals obtain two
secondary level credentials (eg. In Germany some recipients of the Abitur pursue 3 year
apprenticeships which yield vocational qualifications). The third column is 10 multiplied times the
ratio of science, mathematics, computer science and engineering degrees awarded in 1991 at all
levels (BS, MS and PhD) to the labor force 25 to 34.
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TABLE 2: Alternative Estimates of the Present Discounted Value of Earnings and
Productivity Effects of 1 Grade Level Equivalent of General Academic Achievement (Holding
Years of Schooling Fixed)
Female/ Male
Clerical Tech Abil not
Incl.
Tech. Abil
Included
Weekly Earnings of Adult Household Heads
(Panel Study of Income Dynamics--Bishop
1989)
--- $32,000 --
Annual Earnings of the Employed (NCES
Literacy Survey 1994)
$20,100 $20,100 --
Earnings of Youth--17-26 yr olds in 1981-85
(Nat. Long. Survey of Youth--Bishop 1994
Chap 5)
$6,900 $2,900 $10,600
Earnings of Young Adults--25-32 yr
olds--(1990 NLS-Y--Bishop 1994 Chap 5)
$18,200 $13,400 $23,500
Skill Qualification Tests in Military Holding Job
Fixed (Maier & Grafton--Bishop 1994 Chap. 7)
$22,400 $16,100 $31,900
Performance Ratings in Civilian Jobs-Job
fixed (General Aptitude Test Battery--Bishop
1994 Chap 8)
$14,200 $15,600 --
Estimates of the present discounted value (PDV) at age 18 (using a 5 percent real discount rate
and a 45 year working life) of the compensation and productivity effects in 1992-93 dollars of a one
grade level equivalent (GLE) increase in general academic achievement (GAA) while holding years
of schooling constant. By comparison the instructional cost of one year of school was $5566 in
1992-93. PDV is calculated assuming that the earnings/productivity differential is the same in every
year of the individual's working life. Compensation (including employer paid taxes on labor) is
assumed to be 25 percent greater than earnings. A grade level equivalent is defined as equal to
1/5th of a PopSD. General academic achievement includes computational speed, mathematical
reasoning, verbal ability and science knowledge. Results for a broader definition of GAA that also
includes mechanical comprehension and technical knowledge is presented in column 3. Spatial
ability, perceptual ability, clerical speed and psychomotor skills were not considered part of GAA
and their effects were controlled for in the GATB analysis. All models reported here included
controls for years of schooling. Only the PSID analysis corrected for errors in measuring GAA, so
estimates presented in rows 2 to 6 are lower bounds of true effects. The results presented in row 3
and 4 are from earnings regressions and reflect in part higher probabilities of employment and the
on-the-job training received since leaving school (Bishop 1994). Earnings effects of GAA grow with
age, so estimates of lifetime effects are larger when based on 25 to 33 year olds (see row 4). The
results presented in row 5 and 6 are from within job regressions estimated in data on non-
professional and non-managerial occupations. Since job is held fixed, they underestimate the total
effect of GAA. The dollar estimates of productivity effects in military jobs was constructed by
assuming that average productivity of soldiers in clerical jobs was the same as the compensation
of civilian workers in comparable jobs.
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Table 3:  AVERAGE U.S. ACHIEVEMENT TEST SCORES IN SCIENCE, MATHEMATICS, AND READING
Year NAEP Score:
Age 9 –
Science
NAEP Score:
Age 9 –
Mathematics
NAEP Score:
Age 9 –
Reading
NAEP Score:
Age 13 –
Science
NAEP Score:
Age 13 –
Mathematics
NAEP Score:
Age 13 –
Reading
NAEP Score:
Age 17 –
Science
NAEP Score:
Age 17 –
Mathematics
NAEP Score:
Age 17 –
Reading
1970 225 255 305
1971 208 255 285
1973 220 219 250 266 296 304
1975 210 256 286
1977 220 247 290
1978 219 264 300
1980 215 258 286
1982 221 219 250 269 283 298
1984 211 257 289
1986 224 222 251 269 288 302
1998 212 258 290
1990 229 230 209 255 270 257 290 305 290
1992 231 230 210 258 273 260 294 307 290
SOURCE: Mullis et al. (1994) and the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP)
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FIGURE 1 – 4
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FIGURE 5a
FIGURE 5b
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FIGURE 6a: Wage Rate Effects of Skills for Males (1 Pop SD)
FIGURE 6b: Wage Rate Effects of Skills for Females (1 Pop SD)
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FIGURE 6c: Earnings Effects of Skills for Males
FIGURE 6d: Earnings Effects of Skills for Females
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FIGURE 7: Effects of Skills on Productivity in Non Clerical-Non Combat Jobs
FIGURE 8: Effects of Skills on Productivity in Clerical Jobs
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Figure 9: Mathematics at the End of High School
Percent of Age Cohort Taking Advanced Math
Figure 10: Science at the End of High School
Percent of Age Cohort Taking Advanced Math
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Figure 11: Trends in Average U.S. Achievement in Science, Mathematics, and Reading
Source: Mullis et al. (1994) and the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP).
Scale Score
Age 17
Age 13
Age 9
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Figure 12:
